Stochastic Coalitional Games for Cooperative Random Access in M2M
  Communications by Soorki, Mehdi Naderi et al.
Stochastic Coalitional Games for Cooperative
Random Access in M2M Communications
Mehdi Naderi Soorki, Walid Saad, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, and Hossein Saidi
Abstract—In this paper, the problem of random access con-
tention between machine type devices (MTDs) in the uplink of
a wireless cellular network is studied. In particular, the possi-
bility of forming cooperative groups to coordinate the MTDs’
requests for the random access channel (RACH) is analyzed.
The problem is formulated as a stochastic coalition formation
game in which the MTDs are the players that seek to form
cooperative coalitions to optimize a utility function that captures
each MTD’s energy consumption and time-varying queue length.
Within each coalition, an MTD acts as a coalition head that
sends the access requests of the coalition members over the
RACH. One key feature of this game is its ability to cope
with stochastic environments in which the arrival requests of
MTDs and the packet success rate over RACH are dynamically
time-varying. The proposed stochastic coalitional is composed
of multiple stages, each of which corresponds to a coalitional
game in stochastic characteristic form that is played by the
MTDs at each time step. To solve this game, a novel distributed
coalition formation algorithm is proposed and shown to converge
to a stable MTD partition. Simulation results show that, on the
average, the proposed stochastic coalition formation algorithm
can reduce the average fail ratio and energy consumption of
up to 36% and 31% for a cluster-based distribution of MTDs,
respectively, compared to a noncooperative case. Moreover, when
the MTDs are more sensitive to the energy consumption (queue
length), the coalitions’ size will increase (decrease).
Index Terms— Game Theory; Machine-to-Machine Communica-
tions; Internet of Things; Coalitional Games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine-to-machine (M2M) communication between ma-
chine type devices (MTDs) such as sensors or wearables
will lie at the heart of tomorrow’s Internet of Things (IoT)
system [1]. In order to support massive M2M communica-
tions, there is a need for a reliable wireless infrastructure. In
this respect, cellular networks provide an ideal platform for
M2M communications, due to their proven effectiveness and
reliability. However, deploying M2M over cellular networks
such as LTE faces many challenges that range from network
deployment to resource allocation and multiple access [1]–[6].
In particular, in cellular LTE systems, whenever a device
intends to access the network, it begins by following a ran-
dom access (RA) procedure that is done before the resource
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allocation phase as explained in [4] and [7]. During the RA
procedure, each device needs to send a preamble signal over a
special channel, known as the physical random access channel
(RACH), which is used to transmit an initial preamble. In
the RA procedure of a cellular network, the RACH is formed
by a periodic sequence of allocated time-frequency resources,
called random access (RA) slots. These slots are reserved in
the uplink channel of the network for the transmission of
access requests [7]. Thus, the transmission of preambles that
shows the requests made by MTDs for uplink resource, is
synchronized during the RA slots. Each device selects the
preamble uniformly from the available preambles [4]. LTE
typically uses a contention-based random access procedure
for the initial association to the network, for the request of
resources for transmission, and for re-establishing a connection
upon failure [4] and [7]. The contention-based RA procedure
consists of a four-message handshake between any device such
as MTDs and the base station (BS) in order to successfully
transmit an initial preamble. The RA procedure in existing
cellular systems has been mainly designed for human-to-
human (H2H) communication scenarios in which the amount
of uplink (UL) traffic is normally lower than the downlink
(DL) traffic. In contrast, M2M applications will produce
significantly more UL traffic than in the downlink [1]. In
an M2M scenario, during the RA process of LTE, a large
number of MTDs will simultaneously attempt to access a
shared preamble. This can have several drawbacks such as to a
low random access success rate, the waste of radio resources,
packet loss, latency, and extra energy consumption as pointed
out in [1] and [4].
Several recent works have proposed new techniques for
reducing RA congestion in M2M scenarios such as in [4], [8]–
[13]. A number of such works, such as [4], [9], and [10], focus
on the RA process that involves preamble selection, designing
a new preamble sequence, and efficient preamble allocation.
In [11], the authors propose a new backoff algorithm while
the work in [14] introduces a prioritized RA architecture. The
objective in these works is to improve RA efficiency. On the
other hand, there has been a number of recent works such
as [6], [12], [13], [15]–[19], and [20] that focus on how to
cluster MTDs in an efficient way so as to decrease the load
over the RACH. An enhanced RA scheme based on spatial
grouping for reusable preamble allocation is proposed in [12]
and [13]. This scheme reuses the preamble resources based on
spatial grouping during the RA procedure. A group mobility
management mechanism is studied in [15] using which MTDs
are grouped based on the similarity of their mobility patterns
at the location database, and only the leader machine performs
mobility management. Clustering techniques based on quality-
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2of-service (QoS) requirements have been proposed [16], [18]
and [19], for power allocation and energy-efficient M2M
communications. Optimal cluster formation and power control
for maximizing throughput and minimizing transmit power are
derived using mixed-integer non-linear programming in [6]
and [20].
These existing works for M2M clustering such as in [6],
[12], [13], [15]–[19], and [20] have mainly focused on cluster-
ing using spatial metrics such as the distance between MTDs
and some basic QoS metrics. Moreover, these works rely on
centralized algorithms that are normally used to find the opti-
mal clustering of the network. However, a centralized approach
requires collecting a significant amount of information on the
random arrival of requests at the level of the MTDs as well
as on the random collisions that can occur over the RACH. In
an M2M network, this information collection must be updated
every time slot due to the stochastic changes in the arrival of
requests to the MTDs and the possible collisions. If done in
a centralized manner, such a dynamic information update will
significantly increase the signaling overhead over the uplink of
the M2M network and, thus, will not be practical. In addition
to signaling overhead, a centralized approach to coalition
formation is generally known to be NP-complete as shown
in [21], especially for large number of MTDs. The complexity
of such centralized approach grows exponentially with the
number of MTDs because the number of all possible partitions
for MTD set given by a value known as the Bell number [21].
Thus, to decrease the complexity and signaling overhead
it is highly desirable to equip the MTDs with distributed
cooperative strategies that require little or no reliance on
centralized entities such as base stations. Moreover, clustering
MTDs in a practical cellular network must account not only
for spatial metrics and QoS such as in [6], [12], [13], [15]–
[19] and [20], but also for the stochastic changes in the M2M
communication environment. Thus, the need for a stochastic
coalition formation approach results from the fact that, in prac-
tice, an M2M communication network is highly dynamic and
stochastic in nature. This stochastic nature stems from various
features of the M2M environment such as random arrival of
access requests to the MTDs and random preamble collision
over the RACH. Note that modeling and capturing the various
dynamics of the M2M system, such as the random requests
that arrive at the MTDs or random collision over RACH is
very challenging even for a single-cell scenario. In fact, this
dynamic clustering problem has not been considered in any of
the existing literature on M2M such as the works in [6], [12],
[13], [15]–[19] and [20] that also consider a single BS. The
advantages of using a stochastic coalition formation approach
are: 1) distributed solutions do not require any database that
records information such as the MTDs’ locations or stochastic
environment changes such as the random arrival of requests
at the level of the MTDs or the collisions that can occur over
the RACH, 2) the signaling overhead for updating dynamically
varying information decreases in a coalitional game solution
due to the fact that the MTDs will autonomously perform
coalition formation to adapt to the new changes without any
need to send any information to a centralized controller, 3)
the complexity of clustering MTDs is more manageable in
a distributed coalitional game solution because the MTDs
will individually perform distributed coalition formation and,
unlike in the centralized approach, there is no need to search
over all the partitions of the MTDs’ set, and 4) a coalitional
game formulation allows understanding how each MTD can
make its own decision on forming cooperative group in a
self-configuring M2M network. Here, we note that the use
of overlapping coalition formation approaches such as the
ones in [22] and [23] is not suitable for M2M commu-
nication scenarios. Overlapping coalition game models are
useful in problems in which devices can further improve the
system performance and efficiency by splitting their coalition
membership between multiple, overlapping coalitions [22]
and [23]. In the cooperative M2M random access problem,
having an overlap between two coalitions of MTDs will not
lead to sharing additional preambles between the overlapping
coalitions. Moreover, the incoming packet rate of the queues
of devices belonging to overlapping coalitions will increase.
Consequently, as proposed in this work, one must adopt the
more tractable non-overlapping coalition formation approaches
for M2M clustering.
The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the
RA procedure for M2M communications and design a new
coalition formation protocol using which the MTDs can au-
tonomously form clusters or coalitions in the presence of
stochastic arrival requests and a stochastic number of success-
fully transmitted packets over the RACH. We formulate the
problem as a stochastic coalition formation game in which
the MTDs are the players. In this game, the MTDs seek to
cooperate with one another in order to coordinate their RA
and use of the RACH. In particular, within each coalition,
a coalition head sends the access requests of the coalition’s
members. The performance of each coalition is captured via
a utility function that reflects the number of requests that the
coalition members want to send over the RACH and the energy
consumption of its members during each time slot. To solve
this game, we propose an algorithm that enables the MTDs to
form the optimal coalitions while optimizing a utility function
that captures stochastic changes such as the arrival requests of
MTDs and the packet success rate of the RACH. Under these
stochastic changes, we show that the proposed algorithm can
reach a stable partition, if the MTDs are sufficiently farsighted
and they value future payoffs more than the present ones.
For this game, we compute the required threshold of the
farsighted level of the MTDs that is needed to form stable
coalitions under proposed algorithm. Simulation results show
that the proposed approach can reduce the fail ratio and energy
consumption compared to a traditional noncooperative random
access model. The results show that, on the average, the
proposed stochastic cooperative random access model provides
a reduction of the fail ratio and energy power up to 36% and
31% for a cluster-based distribution of MTDs, respectively,
compared to a noncooperative case. We note that, although
coalitional game theory has been used in many works related
to wireless communication such as [24], [25] and [26], to
the best of our knowledge, none of these existing works has
developed a stochastic game model, in general, and for M2M
communication, in particular. In summary, the novelty of our
3contribution, compared to existing work, lies in the following
key points:
• We develop a new, M2M-specific model for the stochastic
value function of an M2M coalition. This model shows
that, after forming coalitions, the value function of the
coalitions will change during the next time slots and
the players will become uncertain about their payoff in
future time slots. Then, in a given time slot, we use a
new coalitional game class, known as games in stochastic
characteristic function form.
• In addition to modeling the cooperation of MTDs during
one time slot as a coalitional game in stochastic char-
acteristic function form, we modeled the cooperation of
MTDs during different time slots as a stochastic coalition
game. In each stage of the stochastic coalition game,
the cooperation of MTDs is modeled using the game
mentioned in the previous bullet.
• For finding stable coalitions under unknown stochastic
changes in the value function, we have developed a novel
coalition formation algorithm that explicitly accounts for
the presence of a discount factor δ in the value function.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the noncooperative random access model in a cellular
LTE network. In Section III, we model the problem using
stochastic coalition formation in games. Simulation results are
presented and analyzed in Section IV. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a cellular network composed of one BS and a
set M of M MTDs that seek to access the network’s uplink
resources to send their data. In this network, the RACH
includes µ preambles. In each time slot, each MTD will
randomly transmit one of these preambles to the BS. We
consider an infinite number of discrete time slots {1, 2, ..., t, ...}
with duration T for each RA slot. In each RA slot, every MTD
m ∈ M transmits its access request with a fixed probability
p. This is a practical assumption when considering the access
barrier algorithm that is used to reshape and distribute the
traffic over the RACH, as discussed in [14] and [27]. Since
our model focuses on the RA process, we do not consider
human type devices as their impact will be equivalent to the
MTDs.
When the MTDs are acting in a noncooperative manner,
if an MTD m selects an RA preamble while other MTDs
that want to transmit RA requests do not select that specific
preamble, then MTD m can successfully transmit an RA
request since there will be no collisions. Hence, if only
MTD m submits an RA request then the probability of its
successful transmission will be equal to the probability of
data transmission p. Thus, the probability that an MTD m
successfully transmits an RA request in a noncooperative
manner is given by:
PMs = p(1 − p)M−1 +
M∑
j=2
1
µ
(
1 − 1
µ
) j−1
PM ( j), (1)
where PM ( j) = M!j!(M−j)! pj(1 − p)M−j is the probability that j
MTDs out of a total of M MTDs transmit their access requests
during the current RA time slot. In (1), 1µ
(
1 − 1µ
) j−1
is the
probability that MTD m selects a preamble which is different
from the preambles that were selected by the other j−1 MTDs.
Due to the random nature of the arrival requests at each
MTD and the departure requests over the RACH, we define a
discrete-time queueing system with Qm,t being the number of
requests that MTD m has buffered at time slot t. We assume
that the maximum number of requests in this queue is K . When
MTDs do not cooperate, the change in the queue length of each
MTD m at each time slot is given by:
Qm,t+1 = max{Qm,t − dm,t + am,t,K}, (2)
where am,t and dm,t represent, respectively, the number of
arrival and departure requests for MTD m conditioned on the
packet success rate over the RACH at time slot t. Qm,t can
be modeled as a G/G/1 queue which represents the queue
length in a system with a single server where inter-arrival times
have a general (arbitrary) distribution and service times have
a (different) general distribution [28]. In particular, we have
Pr(am,t = 1) = p and Pr(dm,t = 1) = PMs . (2) models the B-bit
preambles as a queue at the MAC layer. Some packets can be
dropped due to the limited length of the buffer at the MAC
layer or due to collision over the RACH. At the MAC layer,
the loss is defined by the packet loss rate. For sending one
B-bit preamble from the queue of the MAC layer, each MTD
must transmit B bits over the RA slot.
For simplicity, we assume that each MTD transmits a single,
fixed-sized packet request of size B bits to the BS with transmit
power PzLR. Let ZLR be the number of subcarriers in the
network, with each subcarrier having a bandwidth Bz . Let
hzm = H0 |dm |−νξ be the channel gain for cellular link between
MTD m and BS, where H0 is the path loss constant, dm is
the distance between MTD m and the BS, ν is the path loss
exponent, and ξ is the flat fading Rayleigh parameter with
mean 1. The achievable rate of the cellular link between MTD
m and BS for subcarrier z can be given by:
Rm = Bz log2(1 +
PzLRh
z
m
N0 +
∑
n,m,z′=z
hz
′
n P
z′
LR
), (3)
where
∑
n,m,z′=z
hz
′
n P
z′
LR is the interference received from other
MTDs over the cellular link. (3) shows the achievable rate over
the resource of RA slot in the physical layer of the cellular
link. The loss in the physical layer is due to channel gain,
noise, and interference which are captured by (3). The time
needed to send the B-bit packet will be BRm . We introduce
a power allocation mechanism that allocates power over the
cellular links to guarantee BRm ≤ T at each time slot. Thus,
EzLR = P
z
LR
B
Rm
. The energy consumption per-packet over the
cellular link ELR is defined as the total energy spent during
the RA procedure until the successful transmission of the first
packet over the RACH [4]. In such a noncooperative manner,
the average per-request energy consumption of each MTD m
is given by the series: E¯MLR = P
M
s E
z
LR + P
M
s (1 − PMs )2EzLR +
PMs (1 − PMs )23EzLR + ... which can be written as follow:
4E¯MLR =
∞∑
t=1
PMs (1 − PMs )t−1tEzLR =
∞∑
t=1
PMs (1 − PMs )t−1EzLR +
∞∑
t=2
PMs (1 − PMs )t−1(t − 1)EzLR =
∞∑
t=1
PMs (1 − PMs )t−1EzLR+
(1 − PMs )
( ∞∑
t=2
PMs (1 − PMs )t−2(t − 1)EzLR
)
=
EzLR
PMs
. (4)
Here, if the probability of successful transmission over
RACH is equal to 1, PMs = 1, the average per-request energy
consumption of each MTD m will be EzLR because there is no
collision over the RACH.
The massive amount of incoming access requests stem-
ming from MTDs can lead to a low packet success rate
of the RACH, increased packet loss, intolerable latency, and
increased energy consumption [4], [29]. For M2M communi-
cations, the number of access requests that the MTDs can send
is a more important metric than the bit rate or throughput. This
is due to the fact that, the MTDs usually need to send data at a
very low bit rate (M2M traffic payload size is small) because
the size of the messages is generally very short in M2M
applications (e.g. very few bits coming from a smart meter
or sensor, or even just 1 bit used to inform of the existence or
absence of a given event) [4]. Thus, in the presence of a mas-
sive number of MTDs, one must develop new approaches to
decrease packet loss and energy consumption. Consequently,
the goal for each MTD m is to minimize two objectives: queue
length Qm(t) and energy consumption E¯TL . For each MTD m,
the objective can be viewed as a multi-objective optimization
problem in which the MTD must balance the tradeoff between
queue length and energy consumption. According to linear
scalarization technique [30], the single objective of a multi-
objective optimization scalarized problem is the weighted
summation of multiple objectives, with the weights being the
parameters of the scalarization. Thus, for each MTD m the
objective can be given by:
min(αmQm,t + βmE¯MTL), (5)
where αm and βm are the weights or preferences of MTD
m with respect to the queue length and average energy
consumption per-packet, respectively. These parameters are
used to adjust the scales and units of the queue length (number
of packets) and the energy consumption (joule).
Formally, a coalition S ⊆ M is defined as a subset of M,
while a partition Πt = {S1,S2, ...,S |Πt |} is a set of mutually
disjoint coalitions that span all ofM at time slot t. Whenever a
coalition S of MTDs forms, its members exchange the access
requests in their queues , Qm,t , over short-range (SR) M2M
channels. Thus, the queue of requests in the coalition Si is
equal to QSi,t =
∑
m∈Si Qm,t . Let Q(t) = {Q1,Q2, ...,Q |Πt |} be
a set that represents the lengths of the queues of all coalitions
at time slot t. Once an MTD in S is selected as a coalition
head, it will be responsible to send the access request of its
coalition’s members over the RACH. This coalition head will
be referred to as a machine type head (MTH). In our model,
the set of MTHs of all coalitions within a partition Πt is Ht =
{H1,H2, ...,H |Πt |} at time slot t.
Let aSi,t and dSi,t be, respectively, the arrival rate of
requests to Si and the departure rate of requests from coalition
Si at time slot t. During each time slot, aSi,t can change from
0, which means that none of the MTDs in the coalition Si is
sending an access request, to |Si | which implies that all of the
MTDs in the coalition Si need to send an access request. The
probability that aSi,t = n, where 0 ≤ n ≤ |Si |, is given by:
Pr(aSi,t = n) =
|Si |!
n!(|Si | − n)! p
n(1 − p) |Si |−n. (6)
Here, dSi,t can be 0 or 1, because the head of coalition Si
can successfully send data or a RACH collision may occur,
during each time slot. The probability that dSi,t = 1 is:
Pr(dSi,t = 1) = PHts =
1
µ
(
1 − 1
µ
) |Ht |−1
, (7)
where |Ht | −1 is the number of all coalition heads except that
of coalition Si . The queues of all of these |Ht | − 1 heads are
not empty and all of them want to access to RACH during
time slot. Then, the evolution of queue length of coalition Si
can be given by:
QSi,t+1 = max{QSi,t − dSi,t + aSi,t, k}. (8)
The evolution of the queue length at each MTD m in the
coalition Si , can be given by:
Qm,t+1 = max{Qm,t − wqmdSi,t + am,t, k}, (9)
where wqm is a coefficient that is related to fair scheduling.
In this regard, each coalition head applies a fair scheduling
scheme to select the request of its coalition’s members and,
subsequently, send it over RACH. For example, if we use
a simple round-robin scheme in which the head will collect
sequentially one request from each member in the coalition
Si from queue Qi , the coefficient in (9) will be wqm = 1|Si | .
We define Pz
SR
as transmission power over a direct M2M
link between a MTD and MTH. Let ZSR be the subcarriers
for M2M links, with each subcarrier having a bandwidth Bz .
Further, we let hzim = H0 |dim |−νξ as the channel gain for the
M2M link between MTD m and head of the coalition i where
dim is the distance between MTDs i and m. The achievable rate
of the M2M link between MTD m and head of the coalition
i for subcarrier z can be given by:
Rim = Bz log2
©­­«1 +
Pz
SR
hzim
N0 +
∑
n,m,z′=z
hz
′
nmP
z′
SR
ª®®¬ . (10)
Here, we assume that M2M communications occur over
subcarriers that are orthogonal to the uplink cellular commu-
nication links. Thus, there is no interference between uplink
cellular links and M2M links. Since M2M links are shared
among MTDs to transmit data to the MTHs, there is interfer-
ence among M2M links. The decoding success probability of
MTHs depends on the interference received from other MTDs.
Assuming an interference limited regime, each MTH listens
successfully receives the MTD packets during one time slot
5MTD1
MTD2
MTD4
MTD3
All machine type devices want to access to 
the RACH.
Only the heads of coalitions want to access to 
the RACH. (CFR protocol)
Heavy load RACH
MTD5
MTD6
MTD7
MTD2
MTD4
MTD3
MTD6
MTD7
Low load RACH
MTD5
MTD1
H = fH1; H2; H3g M = fMTD1;MTD2; :::;MTD7g
S1
S2
S3
¼ = fS1;S2;S3g
Fig. 1. An illustration example of stochastic coalition formation and tradi-
tional RACH for M = 7.
if the channel gains between members of each coalition and
allocated power should be high enough to guarantee condition
B
Rim
≤ T . The per-packet energy consumption over M2M link
ESR is defined as the total energy consumed by an MTD to
transmit a single fixed-sized packet request to the MTH of its
coalition. It is given by ESR = PzSR
B
Rim
.
Fig. 1 shows the noncooperative and cooperative random
access model of 7 MTDs for M2M applications. Under a
noncooperative random access model, all 7 MTDs individually
send their access request on their cellular links to BS. In
this case, the RACH model is overloaded by all 7 MTDs.
However, under a cooperative random access model, MTDs,
which are within the coverage of the short-range M2M links,
form a cooperative coalition. Following Fig. 1, MTD 3, MTD
6 and MTD 7 form coalition S1, MTD 2 forms coalition S2
and MTD 1, MTD 4 and MTD 5 form coalition S3. Thus,
during time slot t, the 7 MTDs form cooperative coalitions
Π = {S1,S2,S3}. In this case, the RACH load is affected just
by the three MTHs of the formed coalitions which is much
less than 7 MTDs in noncooperative model.
A. Optimal Solution for Cooperative Random Access in M2M
Communications
We present an optimization formulation for the cooperative
random access in M2M communications. If global network
information is available, then the optimal coalitions can be
computed centrally at the base station. Given a network
partition Π composed of N coalitions, then, let kmn be a binary
variable such that kmn = 1 if MTDm belongs to the coalition
Sn otherwise kmn = 0. The centralized optimization problem
will be:
min
{Π,[kmn]M×N }
∑
m
∞∑
t=t0
δt−t0Qm,t, (11)
∞∑
t=t0
δt−t0
(
wmELR(Π) + ESR(Si)
) ≤ Emax, ∀m ∈ M, (12)
kmn × krn BT ≤ Rrm, ∀Sn ∈ Π, (13)∑
n
kmn = 1 , ∀m ∈ M, (14)
∑
m∈M
∑
n∈N
kmn = M, (15)
kmn ∈ {0, 1}, ∀m ∈ M, ∀Si ∈ Π. (16)
The objective function in (11) minimizes the discounted sum
of the queue lengths of the MTDs over time. (12) guarantees
that the discounted sum of per-request energy consumption of
all MTDs is less than its predefined maximum value. (13)
indicates that the bit rate of the M2M link between two
MTDs in each coalition should be high enough to allow the
transmission of one B-bit packet between them. (14) shows
that each MTD can only be on one coalition. (15) guarantees
that all MTDs are considered in the coalition formation.
(16) shows that kmn is a binary. (11) is a combinatorial
optimization problem with an exponential search space. The
reason is that the number of all partitions given by a value
known as the Bell number which grows exponentially with the
number of MTDs in the coalitions [21] and [31]. (11) can be
solved by potentially deterministic exhaustive search algorithm
[21]. However, due to size of our problem, we apply genetic
algorithms which are a class of stochastic search algorithms
that have been used widely to solve large-scale NP-complete
combinatorial optimization problems including searching for
optimal coalition structures [31].
III. STOCHASTIC GAME-THEORETIC MODEL FOR M2M
COOPERATION
In this section, we model the proposed cooperative random
access model for M2M communication over the RACH using
cooperative game theory [32]. First, we focus on the coop-
eration of MTDs during each time slot given the stochastic
queue lengths of MTDs and we model it using a coalition
game in stochastic characteristic function form (CGSC) [33].
The goal of this CGSC is to find the formed coalitions
during each time slot. Then, for modeling the cooperation of
MTDs during different time slots, we use the framework of
stochastic coalitional games (SCGs) [34]. An SCG captures
how the formation of cooperative coalitions can change due to
stochastic factors, such as random arrivals. Thus, in our model,
an SCG can be seen as a repeated game with one of its stages
being a CGSC that is played by MTDs. Finally, we propose an
algorithm to solve the SCG in stochastic characteristic function
form and find a stable partition.
A. Coalitional game formulation during one time slot
In each time slot, a coalitional game in stochastic charac-
teristic function form is uniquely defined by the pair (M, vt ),
where the setM of players is the set of MTDs and vt : Πt →
R |Si | is a stochastic value that reflects the utilities achieved
by the coalitions formed at a given time slot t. This game
is different from a classical coalitional game such as in [35]
in that the coalitional value is stochastic. First, from (7) and
(8), we can see that queue length of each coalition, which
depends on the packet success rate over RACH, is affected by
other coalitions. Thus, the cooperation model in each time slot
can be mapped to a coalitional game in partition form which
6can be significantly challenging to solve when the value is
stochastic [36]. To over come this challenge, the cooperating
MTDs will assume that all of the other MTDs at each time slot
want to access the RACH and do not form any coalition. Such
an assumption maps to a conservative strategy in which the
MTDs in each coalition assume the worst-case collision rate
from other MTDs. This is in line with existing works such
as the jamming games in [37], in which it is assumed that
all other players jam a coalition in a cognitive radio network.
Consequently, in this worst case scenario, the probability of
the packet success rate over RACH, dSi,t = 1, is given by:
Pr(dSi,t = 1) = PHs =
1
µ
(1 − 1
µ
)M−|Si | . (17)
In this case, we can compute the value of each coalition
independently of the coalition decisions of other MTDs. Now,
the value of a coalition Si will depend only on its members,
vt : Si → R |Si | , and, thus, we have a game in characteristic
function form [36].
Given the dynamic changes in queues , Qt , and the probabil-
ity of the packet success rate, PHts , over the RACH, the value
of the coalitions will randomly change over time. Thus, during
each time slot t, the stochastic value of this game is a random
variable which consists of two components (ud , ur ) [33]: a
deterministic value (ud) gained in the current time slot and a
random value (ur ) that captures the prospective gains in future
time slots.
1) Deterministic value for the current time slot: The de-
terministic value for the current time slot of a coalition can
be directly computed by the members of a coalition since
it is a certain outcome. This deterministic component is not
related to the random value changes that will happen in
future time slots. We consider two cooperation schemes for
the proposed RACH coalitional game: altruistic cooperation,
in which MTDs cooperate to maximize the value of their
coalition or selfish cooperation in which MTDs may cooperate
to increase their individual payoffs.
Altruistic cooperation: altruistic MTDs seek to decrease
the overall group queue length and group energy consumption
of their formed coalition. In such a scenario, MTDs are mainly
concerned with the overall gain of the coalition rather than
their individual payoffs. In this case, the deterministic current
time slot value of the coalition ud(Si,QSi,t ) ∈ R is a real
value that is equal to the payoff of each machine MTD m in
the coalition Si . For each MTD m in Si , the payoff function
will be equal to the value function::
ud(Si,QSi,t ) = −αm |QSi,t |−βm
(
E¯HLR
|Si | + ESR
)
−γm |Si |, (18)
where γm is a unit cost parameter for MTD m. E¯HTL and QSi,t
are respectively given by (4) and (8), when we use (17) as the
probability of the packet success rate over the RACH which
is same as the probability of departure from the queue.
Selfish cooperation: each selfish MTD will seek to decrease
its individual queue length and energy consumption in the
formed coalition, while disregarding the overall social welfare
of the entire coalition. In this case, the deterministic current
time slot value of the coalition is no longer a function over
3
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Fig. 2. The transition probability model for queue changes during one time
slot.
the real line. Instead, the deterministic current time slot value
of a coalition is a set of payoff vectors, Ud(Si,QSi,t ) ⊆ R |Si | ,
where each element ud,m(Si,QSi,t ) of any vector ud ∈ Ud
represents the payoff of each MTD m in the coalition Si ,
which is given by:
ud,m(Si,QSi,t ) = −αm |Qm,t | − βm(wemE¯HLR + ESR) − γm |Si |,
(19)
where E¯HTL and Qm,t are respectively given by (4) and (9) when
we use (17) as a probability of the RACH packet success rate
(which is the same as the probability of departure from the
queue) and wem is the fairness weight for time of being head.
2) Random value for future time slots: To capture the
random component of the value of each coalition, we consider
discounted future rewards for each MTD. For each MTD m
at time slot t, a discounted future reward is the sum of future
payoffs during the following time slots, t+1, t+2, ..., which are
discounted by a constant factor [38]. If we consider the same
discount factor δ, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, for all MTDs, then a higher δ
will reflect MTDs that are farsighted and, thus, more interested
in the payoff of the next time slots rather than the current
one. Thus, the random values ur (Si,QSi,t ) for the altruistic
scheme, and ur,m(Si,QSi,t ) for the selfish scheme that capture
the payoff during future time slots, will be given by:
ur (Si,QSi,t ) =
nδ∑
n=t+1
δn−t u¯d(Si,QSi,t→n)
ur,m(Si,QSi,t ) =
nδ∑
n=t+1
δn−t u¯d,m(Si,QSi,t→n) (20)
Here, nδ is a discrete value where δm ' 0 for nδ ≤ m.
ud(Si,QSi,t→n) and ud,m(Si,QSi,t→n) are stochastic processes
which stochastically change from current time slot t to the
future time slot n. u¯d(Si,QSi,t→n) and u¯d,m(Si,QSi,t→n) are
the expectation of random changes of ud(Si,QSi,t→n) and
ud,m(Si,QSi,t→n) from time slot t to the time slot n. These
values depend on the change in the queue during n − t time
slots, QSi,t→n. The stochastic change of the queue in one time
slot, QSi,t→t+1, is modeled by the probabilistic model shown
in Fig. 2. Since the arrivals and departures of requests from
each coalition are independent event, Pr(di,t = i, ai,t = j) =
Pr(di,t = i) × Pr(ai,t = j) where Pr(di,t = i) and Pr(ai,t = j)
are given by (6) and (7). In general, u¯d(Si,QSi,t→n) is:
u¯d(Si,QSi,t→n) = ∆nt ud(Si,QSi,n), for the altruistic scheme, and
u¯d,m(Si,QSi,t→n) = ∆nt ud,m(Si,QSi,n), for the selfish scheme.
(21)
7Here, ud(Si,QSi,n) and ud,m(Si,QSi,n) are given by (18) and
(19), respectively, and ∆nt is the probability of transition from
QSi,t to QSi,n during n−t time slots. This probability depends
on the (n− t)-hop path from QSi,t to QSi,n in Fig. 2. This path
reflects how the queue of coalition Si changes during n−t time
slots, QSi,t → QSi,n. The probability of change in the queue
is equal to the sum of probabilities over all paths from QSi,t
to QSi,n:
∆nt =
∑
all paths: QSi , t→QSi ,n
Pr(QSi,t → QSi,n). (22)
From Fig. 2, we can see that there is a one-hop path between
QSi,t and QSi,t+1. This path captures the stochastic change of
a queue during one time slot. This one-hop path reflect the
event during which queue QSi,t changes to QSi,t + j where
j = −1, 0, ..., |Si |. The probability that the queue changes due
to a one-hop path, p(QSi,t → QSi,t + j), can be found in Fig.
2. For ∆t+2t , the number of paths becomes greater than one.
For example, if QSi,t+2 = QSi,t +3 then there are |Si |+2 two-
hop paths during 2 time slots to change the queue length from
QSi,t to QSi,t + 3, which are QSi,t → QSi,t + i → QSi,t + 3
for i = −1, 0, ..., |Si |. Then, the probability of each path is
calculated by multiplying the probability of two hops of Fig. 2.
After computing the deterministic value for current time slot
and the random value for future time slots, we can explicitly
define the value of each coalition or payoff function of each
MTD. For instance, when MTDs are altruistic, the value of
coalition Si is equal to the payoff function of each MTD in
the coalition as follows:
va(Si,QSi,t ) = ud(Si,QSi,t0 ) + ur (Si,QSi,t0 ). (23)
When MTDs are altruistic, the value of each coalition Si
will be a real value that is equal to the benefit achieved
by each individual MTD. If the MTDs are selfish, then the
deterministic current time slot value and random value for
future time slots will be, respectively, a set of payoff vectors
Ud(Si,QSi,t ) and Ur (Si,QSi,t ) ⊆ R |Si | . Thus, the value of a
coalition, which is the sum of the deterministic current time
slot value and random value for future time slots, becomes
a set of vectors, Vs(Si,QSi,t ) ⊆ R |Si | with each element
vsm(Si,QSi,t ) of any vector vs ∈ Vs is the payoff function
of each MTD in the coalition. The payoff function of a given
MTD m in coalition Si is given by:
vsm(Si,QSi,t ) = ud,m(Si,QSi,t0 ) + ur,m(Si,QSi,t0 ). (24)
Following (23) and (24), in the CGSC, the value of a
coalition and the payoff of each MTD will depend on the
formed coalition and its queue. Since the queue cannot be
arbitrary shared among members of coalition, the CGSC is a
game with non-transferable utility (NTU) [36].
B. Random access as an M-person stochastic coalition game
Next, we model the cooperation of MTDs during different
time slots as an SCG [34]. In each stage of this SCG, the
cooperation of MTDs is modeled using a CGSC [33]. The
players in the SGC are also the MTDs in the setM. The SCG
is played in such a way that, at each time slot t, the MTDs
decide on their membership in a formed coalition Π(t). Their
decisions depend on the random conditions of the game. The
state of the SCG at a slot t is denoted by ht = (Π(t),Q(t)). This
state is a two-dimensional random variable with discrete finite
states which means MTDs form coalitions Π(t) while Q(t)
is the set of queue of the coalitions. Q(t) is stochastically
changing at each time slot t. Consequently, the RACH M-
person stochastic coalition game in stochastic characteristic
function (MSCF) is uniquely defined by the triplet (M, vt, ht ).
Thus, the MTDs choose the actions that lead to forming
disjoint coalitions and each MTD receives a stochastic payoff
vt at each time slot t which is given by (23) or (24).
The formed MTD coalitions may randomly change during
different time slots, because the arrival and departure processes
of the coalitions’ queues can stochastically change. Therefore,
at each stage of an MSCF, the MTDs form the most suitable
coalitions depending on the queues. Let ht = (Π(t),Q(t)) be
the state of the coalition formation process at time slot t.
As shown in [35], the process of coalition formation is a
stochastic process ζ which starts from an initial state h0 and
moves to another state ht following the stochastic changes in
the queues of the coalitions when going form the time slot 0 to
the time slot t. Our goal is to find a stable state of ζ which is
essentially a stable partition, Π∗, ofM. Consequently, we can
find how coalitions are formed by MTDs given the stochastic
changes of their queues.
First, we define the moves or decisions that are going to
be used in our proposed algorithm. Consider a state ht =
(Π(t),Q(t)) and a coalition Si , then, we make the following
definition:
Definition 1. Let FSi (ht ) be the set of states achievable by a
one-step coalitional move (by Si) which changes the coalition
formation, Π(t), when an M-person stochastic coalition game
in stochastic characteristic function form is in state ht .
There are three types of moves for each MTD m at each
time slot t. The first is Si , which means that the members of
Si do not change their coalition. The second type of moves
for each MTD m is Cm = {C1, C2, ..., C|Si |−1}, where Ck is a
k-person coalition for MTD m that consists of MTD m and
k − 1 members from Si . Cm is the set of all possible k-person
coalitions that MTD m ∈ Si can form with k < |Si | other
members in the coalition Si . The total number of moves in
Cm is |Cm | = ∑ |Si |−1k=1 Ck where |Ck | = ( |Si |−1)!(k−1)!( |Si |−k−2)! . The
last type of move occurs when MTD m in the coalition Si
asks other coalition Sj to form a new larger coalition which
is Si ∪ Sj . Consequently, the total of one-step move for each
MTD m in the coalition Si given by:
FmSi (ht ) = Si ∪ Cm ∪ {Si j |∀ j , i}. (25)
Therefore, a one-step coalitional move is equal to the union
of the one-step moves of all of the MTDs in Si denoted
by FSi (ht ) = {∪m∈SiFmSi (ht )}. After determining all possible
one-step coalitional moves, we can now define the concept of
a profitable move [39]:
Definition 2. Si has a (weakly) profitable move from Π1t
(under ζ) if there is Π2t ∈ FSi (ht ) (with Π2(t) , Π1(t)) such
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Inputs: M, Π(t0), Q(t0)
Initialize:
Set initial state and discount factor as ht0 = {Π(t0), Q(t0)} and δ,
respectively.
Find the discrete value nδ where δm ' 0 for nδ ≤ m.
Stage 1:
(a) For each coalition Si , calculate stochastic change of the
queue, QSi , t0→t0+nδ , until time slot t0+nδ , using the transition
probability model in Fig. 2.
(b) Determine the value functions of MTDs in the partition Π(t0),
using (20).
(c) For each MTD m ∈ Si , find Cm including all possible k-
person coalitions.
(d) For each MTD m ∈ Si , find all possible coalitions such as
Sj that forming Si ∪ Sj is a profitable move.
Stage 2:
(a) For each coalition Sk ∈ FmSi (ht ), calculate stochastic change
of the queue, QSk , t→t+nδ , until time slot t0 + nδ , using the
transition probability model in Fig. 2.
(b) Do the most preferable one-step coalitional move in FSi (ht ).
Stage 3: while Π(t0) changes for two consecutive iterations
repeat Stage 1 to Stage 2
Output: Stably formed coalition: Π∗
that vm(Π2(t), ζ) ≥ vm(Π1(t), ζ) for all m ∈ Si . Si has a strictly
profitable move from Π1(t) if there is Π2(t) ∈ FSi (ht ) such
that vm(Π2(t), ζ) > vm(Π1(t), ζ) for all m ∈ Si .
By using the notion of a profitable move, we will propose
an M-person stochastic coalition formation algorithm that can
be used to enable the MTDs to perform distributed coalition
formation under a stochastic characteristic function form. The
phases of algorithm are:
Initial Phase: At each time slot t0, the initial partition can
be a singleton network partition: Π(t0) = {{1}, {2}, ..., {M}}
or a grand coalition:Π(t0) = {1, 2, ...,M}.
Sequential Phase: The stochastic coalition formation algo-
rithm keeps on iterating over all the MTDs in the network
until all MTDs decide to stay in their current coalition, which
indicates that the algorithm has converged to a final stable
network partition Π∗(t0). In each iteration, each MTD m
member of a the coalition Si follows its most preferable one-
step coalitional move which is in FmSi (ht ).
A summary of the stochastic coalition formation algorithm
is presented in Table I. Next, we analyze the convergence
and stability of the proposed algorithm. First, we define a
deterministic process of coalition formation as follow [39]:
Definition 3. For all formed coalitions Π1t and Π2t , a process of
coalition formation is said to be deterministic if the transition
probability from coalition Π1t to coalition Π
2
t in each time slot
t, p(Π1t ,Π2t ) is in {0, 1}.
Lemma 1. The proposed M-person stochastic coalition forma-
tion algorithm in Table I is a deterministic process of coalition
formation.
Proof. During the coalition formation process in Table I, when
coalition Π1t is formed at a given step, if there is at least one
profitable move for MTDs, the algorithm in Table I will go
to coalition Π2t in the next step with probability one. If there
is no profitable move for MTDs, the probability to change
the formed coalition from Π1t to Π
2
t is zero. Therefore, the
algorithm in Table I deterministically changes the coalition
formation process. 
Definition 4. Under a stochastic change of the coalition value,
a formed partition Π∗ is said to be stable, if no MTD m in
the coalition S∗i nor any group of MTDs can form another
coalition. For a stable coalition, Π∗, the following conditions
are satisfied for all S∗i and S∗j ∈ Π∗:
vm(S∗i ,QSi,t ) ≥ vm(Ck,QCk,t ), k = 1, 2, ..., |S∗i | − 1,
vm(S∗i ,QSi,t ) ≥ vm(S∗i ∪ S∗j ,QSi,t +QSj,t ). (26)
Based on (26), in a stable partition, Π∗, no MTD m in S∗i
can benefit by forming any k-person coalition that is different
from the current coalition S∗i nor by enabling its coalition to
form a new, bigger coalition with other coalition S∗j . Thus, in
a stable partition, each MTD m prefers to stay in its current
coalition. As shown in [39, Theorem 4.1], for any deterministic
process of coalition formation in characteristic function form,
there exists a discount factor δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any
collection of discount factors in (δ∗, 1), that deterministic
process converges to the unique limit which is the coalitions
that will effectively form. According to [39, Theorem 4.1] and
Lemma 1, we can state the following result for our proposed
algorithm in Table I.
Theorem 1. For the proposed deterministic M-person stochas-
tic coalition formation algorithm in Table I, there exists a
discount factor δ∗ such that for any collection of discount
factors in (δ∗, 1), the unique limit of algorithm in Table I will
be Π∗ with v(S∗i ,QSi,t ) . δ∗ can be found from the following
conditions:∞∑
n=t+1
δn−t
(
∆nt ud(S∗i ,QS∗i ,n) − ∆nt ud(Ck,QCk,n)
) ≥
ud,m(Ck,QCk,t ) − ud,m(S∗i ,QS∗i ,t ),
∀S∗i ∈ Π∗, k = 1, 2, ..., |S∗i | − 1, and,
∞∑
n=t+1
δn−t
(
∆nt ud(S∗i ,QS∗i ,n) − ∆nt ud(S∗i ∪ S∗j ,QS∗i∪ S∗j,n)
) ≥
ud,m(S∗i ∪ S∗j ,QS∗i∪ S∗j,t ) − ud,m(S∗i ,QS∗i ,t ),
∀S∗j ∈ Π∗,S∗j , S∗i . (27)
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Following Lemma 1, Theorem 1, and Definition 4, we can
see that there exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all discount factors
in (δ∗, 1), the proposed algorithm in Table I will converge to
a stable partition Π∗.
C. Complexity and Stability Analysis
The complexity of the algorithm in Table I lies in the
complexity of the preferable one-step coalitional movement.
Therefore, a good measure of complexity will be the number
9of possible (per coalition) movements. For a given network
structure, one possible move for a coalition Si is to form a
new larger coalition Si ∪ Sj . This move implies that a given
coalition will try to merge with other coalitions while ensuring
that the bit rate between the members of the merged coalition
is equal to or larger than the desirable rate, i.e., BT ≤ Rim. In
the most complex case, the total number of merge attempts
will be M(M−1)2 . The second type of coalition moves occurs
when the MTDs in a given coalition Si want to split and form
a k-person coalition out of coalition Si where k < |Si |. The
total number of split moves for each MTD m is |Cm |. The most
complex case for splitting occurs when the network forms an
M-person grand coalition. The total number of split attempts
will be
∑M
m=1 |Cm |. In terms of computations, for each move-
ment, the value function should be calculated under stochastic
changes. This calculation depends on the queue length in the
coalition and the value of δ. A larger value of δ leads to the
need for computing additional terms in (14) and (16). To show
the effect of δ on the number of terms of the series in (14)
and (16), for each value of δ, we define a discrete value nδ
where δm ' 0 for nδ ≤ m. This means that value function
should be calculated until next nδ time slots. Following (14)
and (16), in the worst case, the complexity of calculating the
value function is
(
min{M,K})nδ where M is the maximum
size of grand coalition and K is maximum available buffer
size. Consequently, the complexity of the proposed algorithm
in Table I is O
( ( ∑M
m=1 |Cm | + M(M−1)2
) × ( min{M,K})nδ ) .
In practice, the merge process requires a significantly lower
number of attempts because the MTDs can only attempt
to merge with coalitions within their communication range
that also satisfy the bit rate requirement. Since the size of
a coalition is typically small and limited due to the cost
for cooperation, the split moves will be limited to finding
all possible partitions for small sets. Consequently, we will
seldom encounter an M−sized coalition. In fact, most formed
coalitions will be of size K that is much smaller than M .
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For our simulations, we consider a single cell served by one
BS that is located at the center of a 400 m × 400 m square area.
We consider two distribution models of the MTDs around the
BS: (A) uniform and (B) cluster-based distributions. In the
uniform distribution model, the MTDs randomly distributed
across square area. In a cluster-based distribution, we consider
cluster centers with density of 5 × 10−5 cluster/m2 whose
locations result from the realization of a Poisson point process.
In each cluster, the locations of the MTDs result from the
realization of a normal distribution around the cluster center.
The number of MTDs per cluster is determined by a Poisson
distribution whose mean value is equal to the ratio of the
number of MTDs to the number of cluster centers in each
realization. The time slot for complete RA request is set to
T = 1 millisecond. The number of available preambles for
RACH is µ = 256. The maximum power consumption on each
RB for sending data over the cellular link to the BS is set to
25 dBm. The maximum size of each queue is K = 30. We
assume that the maximum power consumption used by MTDs
for sending requests to a coalition head is 5 dBm on each
RB [19] during each time slot. The bandwidth of each resource
block is 15 kHz. We consider a 2 GHz carrier frequency. The
noise power spectral density N0 is âL´Š170 dBm per Hz. We
consider a path loss exponent of 2.5 and a Rayleigh fading
with mean 1 for the channel model. Moreover, the length of
each packet is set to 50 bits. We consider that the probability
of sending a request for each MTD, p, is equal to 0.3. The unit
cost parameter, γ is 0.2. For each number of MTDs, we apply
proposed stochastic coalition formation algorithm in Table I
to find out the cooperative groups.
A. Effect of the number of MTDs
Figs. 3, 4, and 5 show the effect of the number of MTDs
on the stochastic cooperative random access model. In these
figures, the number of MTDs is varied from 200 to 1000.
Fig. 3 shows the network’s fail ratio which is defined as
the ratio between the number of requests that collided and
the total number of requests that all MTDs sent over the
RACH during each time slot. From Fig. 3, we can see that, by
increasing the number of MTDs, the fail ratio increases. This
is due to the fact that, when the number of MTDs increases,
the average arrival rate of the queue in each formed coalition
increases. Consequently, sending the access requests over the
RACH increases, and, thus, the fail ratio resulting from the
stochastic cooperative random access model will increase to
the same value of traditional noncooperative random access
model. On the average, Fig. 3 shows that the stochastic
cooperative random access model reduces the fail ratio of
around 14% and 34%, for uniform distribution and cluster-
based distribution, respectively, compared to the traditional
random access protocol, and, on the average, the stochastic
cooperative random access model increases the fail ratio of
around 17% and 32%, for uniform distribution and cluster-
based distributions, respectively, compared to the optimal
solution. However, the complexity of the optimal solution
is significantly larger than the complexity of our proposed
distributed algorithm. In particular, the complexity of the
optimal solution grows exponentially with the number of
MTDs while the required iterations for convergence of the
proposed algorithm is restricted to the number of merge-and-
split moves per coalition. Thus, the proposed solution offers
a better balance between complexity and performance.
In Fig. 4, we show the average per-MTD energy consump-
tion for transmitting over the RACH. From Fig. 4, we can see
that the average per-MTD energy consumption resulting from
the proposed stochastic cooperative random access model is
less than the one resulting from the traditional noncooperative
random access model. The reason is that, in each coalition, all
of the MTDs share the energy consumed for acting as head.
Fig. 4 also shows that selfish and altruistic coalition formation
achieve an almost equal fail ratio and energy consumption.
When the MTDs are distributed according to cluster-based dis-
tribution, the performance of the proposed coalition formation
algorithm improves for both the fail ratio and energy con-
sumption. Fig. 4 also shows that, on the average, the proposed
approach reduces the energy consumption of around 16% and
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31% for uniform distribution and cluster-based distributions,
respectively, compared to a traditional random access protocol.
Moreover, on the average, the stochastic cooperative random
access model consumes around 14% and 27% more energy
compared to the optimal solution, for the uniform and cluster-
based distribution, respectively.
Fig. 5 shows the price of anarchy which is defined as
the ratio between the utility achieved by the MTDs at the
convergence of the proposed stochastic cooperative random
access model and the utility achieved by the MTDs under
the optimal solution. Note that we are interested in price of
anarchy values that are close to 1 (or 100%) in which case the
formed cooperative groups at the convergence of the proposed
stochastic coalitional game provide a good approximation of
the optimal solution. In Fig. 5, we can see that, by increasing
the number of MTDs, the price of anarchy decreases due to
the fact that a a network having more MTDs will provide
more opportunities for cooperation. Thus, the number of stable
cooperative groups resulting from the proposed stochastic
cooperative random access model is greater than the number of
clusters under the optimal solution in (11). The highest price of
anarchy is observed when the MTDs are distributed according
to a cluster-based distribution under altruistic cooperation. On
the average, Fig. 5 shows that the price of anarchy is 80% and
93% (76% and 83%) for uniform distribution and cluster-based
distribution under altruistic (selfish) cooperation, respectively.
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Thus, on the average, the performance gap between the pro-
posed distributed algorithm and the optimal solution are 20.5%
and 13.5% for the uniform and cluster-based distributions,
respectively. However, the complexity and signaling overhead
of our proposed distributed algorithm are much smaller than
the signaling overhead and complexity of the optimal solution.
Fig. 6 shows how the number of iterations needed for con-
vergence of the proposed algorithm in Table I, for two different
values of the discount factor δ when the MTDs are altruistic.
From this figure, we can see that, when the number of MTDs
is 600 for uniform (cluster-based) distribution, the number of
iterations will be 150 and 115 (195 and 165) for discount factor
values of 0.5 and 0.8, respectively. By increasing the number
of MTDs, the number of iterations increases. When the number
of MTDs increases, the MTDs will form more coalitions
with smaller size. This means that MTDs in a large coalition
would prefer to split into smaller ones. In the cluster-based
distribution, the size of coalitions is larger than in the uniform
distribution. Thus, the number of iterations needed to form
stable coalitions is smaller for the cluster-based distribution.
When the discount factor increases, the MTDs become more
motivated to stay in their coalition for future payoff, thus the
number of iterations decreases. Such a number of iterations
is quite reasonable for a dense network having thousands
of MTDs, as it implies roughly about 3 to 4 iterations per
device. As explained next, such a convergence time, which
is needed only for the initial coalition formation process, is
practical. In essence, an initial delay is required for achieving
the stability of all coalitions. In addition, the convergence
results shown correspond to a network which starts with an
initial state in which each MTD is a singleton, noncooperative
player. Such an initial state is, in fact, the worst-case, in
terms of convergence time. Once these singleton MTDs form
their initial set of coalitions, if there is a need to re-run
the coalition formation process due to stochastic changes in
environment, the algorithm will be performed starting from
the last convergence state not the initial state. Naturally, such
a process will require fewer iterations than in the initial state,
as the MTDs would have already self-organized into an initial
set of coalitions. Moreover, in practice, the changes in the
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Fig. 6. Effect of number of MTDs on the number of iterations.
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Fig. 7. Effect of number of MTDs on the number of moves per coalition.
location or incoming traffic of MTDs happen only within a
limited area of the network. Thus, there is no need to perform
the proposed distributed algorithm for all of the MTDs.
Fig. 7 shows how the average number of moves per coalition
changes as a function of the network size and the discount
factor, in the case of selfish cooperation. For example, when
the number of MTs is 600 for the uniform (cluster-based)
distribution, the average number of moves per coalition will be
around 1 and 2 (3 and 6) for δ = 0.5 and δ = 0.8, respectively.
As the number of MTDs increases, the average number of
moves per coalition decreases. Moreover, the average number
of moves per coalition becomes smaller for higher values
of δ. This decrease in the average number of moves per
coalition can be explained as follow. When the number of
MTDs increases, the fail ratio (energy consumption) of MTDs
achieved by our proposed coalition formation under stochastic
changes decreases (increases) (See Figs. 3 and 4), and the
MTDs prefer to form smaller-sized coalitions. This naturally
justifies the smaller number of moves per coalition. Moreover,
as δ increases, the MTDs become more farsighted and, as a
result, they will be more inclined stay in their coalitions instead
of moving to form other coalitions.
B. Effect of preferences
As shown in Figs. 8 and 9, we consider three scenarios:
Scenario I in which MTDs are more sensitive to the queue
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Fig. 8. Effect of preference of MTDs on fail ratio when M = 500.
length than the energy consumption (α = 0.9, β = 0.1), and
Scenario II in which MTDs are equally sensitive to the queue
length and as energy consumption (α = 0.5, β = 0.5), and
Scenario III where MTDs favor the queue length less than
energy consumption (α = 0.1, β = 0.9). To show the effect
of the signaling overhead, we analyze the results of the three
scenarios for two different values of γ, i.e., 0.05 and 0.2.
The number of MTDs is 500 and the probability of sending
requests to the BS is 0.3.
According to Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, in Scenario I (III) the
average fail ratio and energy consumption increase (decrease)
under the stochastic cooperative random access model when
compared with Scenario II. In addition, when the cost of the
signaling overhead decreases, the average fail ratio and energy
consumption decrease in all of the scenarios. For example,
when γ = 0.2, under the selfish (altruistic) cooperation scheme
for uniform (cluster-base) distribution, the average fail ratios
are 0.62, 0.44, and 0.38 (0.34, 0.28, and 0.21), and the
energy consumption per MTD will be 0.82, 0.53, and 5.1
(0.47, 0.44, and 0.41) mJoules for Scenarios I, II, and III,
respectively. Here, we observe that the coalition size decreases
(increases) in Scenario I (III) and the number of formed
coalitions increases (decreases) in Scenario I (III). An increase
in the number of formed coalitions leads to additional load
over the RACH and a larger coalition size leads to less energy
consumption for the members of the coalition. Consequently,
the fail ratio and energy consumption increase for Scenario I,
but the fail ratio and energy consumption decrease for Scenario
III. When the unit cost parameter of the signaling overhead
becomes smaller for the MTDs, the coalition size increases.
Thus, the fail ratio and energy consumption decreases when
γ = 0.05.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel queue length
and energy-aware cooperation scheme for optimizing RACH
access in M2M cellular networks. In the proposed model, the
MTDs autonomously engage in a coalition formation process
to coordinate their RACH access by forming cooperative
groups. We have modeled the cooperation of MTDs during
each time slot as a coalitional game in stochastic characteristic
function form. In this game, the MTDs seek to optimize a
payoff function that includes two components: a deterministic
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Fig. 9. Effect of preference of MTDs on energy consumption when M = 500.
component related to the certain payoff achieved at the current
time slot and a random term that corresponds to the correspond
stochastic payoff achieved in future time slots. To model the
cooperation of MTDs during different time slots, we have used
an M-person stochastic coalition game. To solve this game,
we have introduced a novel coalition formation algorithm that
is shown to reach a stable partition. We have considered not
only the energy consumption but also queue length of access
requests as the payoff of the MTDs. We have shown that,
despite the stochastic changes in the payoff of the MTDs,
the MTDs can form stable coalitions, if they are sufficiently
farsighted. Simulation results have also shown that on the
average, the proposed stochastic coalition formation algorithm
can significantly reduce the fail ratio and energy consumption
of the system. For future work, we can analyze the system in
presence of multiple base stations and inter-cell interference.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix, we are going to prove the minimum of δ.
Considering the stability conditions in (26) and Ck in Cm:
vm(S∗i ,QSi,t ) ≥ vm(Ck,QCk,t ),
following (24), we can write:
ud,m(S∗i ,QS∗i ,t ) + ur,m(S∗i ,QS∗i ,t ) ≥ ud,m(Ck,QCk,t )
+ ur,m(Ck,QCk,t ),
according to (20), we can write:
ud,m(S∗i ,QS∗i ,t ) +
∞∑
n=t+1
δn−t u¯d(S∗i ,QSi∗,t→n) ≥
ud,m(Ck,QCk,t ) +
∞∑
n=t+1
δn−t u¯d(Ck,QCk,t→n),
considering (21), we can write:
ud,m(S∗i ,QS∗i ,t ) +
∞∑
n=t+1
δn−t∆nt ud(S∗i ,QS∗i ,n) ≥
ud,m(Ck,QCk,t ) +
∞∑
n=t+1
δn−t∆nt ud(Ck,QCk,n),
where ∆nt can be calculated by (22). By some simplification,
we can write:
∞∑
n=t+1
δn−t
(
∆nt ud(S∗i ,QS∗i ,n) − ∆nt ud(Ck,QCk,n)
) ≥
ud,m(Ck,QCk,t ) − ud,m(S∗i ,QS∗i ,t ).
Consequently, we can find out the minimum of δ by
considering all of these conditions simultaneously:
∞∑
n=t+1
δn−t
(
∆nt ud(S∗i ,QS∗i ,n) − ∆nt ud(Ck,QCk,n)
) ≥
ud,m(Ck,QCk,t ) − ud,m(S∗i ,QS∗i ,t )
∀S∗i ∈ Π∗, k = 1, 2, ..., |S∗i | − 1, and,
∞∑
n=t+1
δn−t
(
∆nt ud(S∗i ,QS∗i ,n) − ∆nt ud(S∗i ∪ S∗j ,QS∗i∪ S∗j,n)
) ≥
ud,m(S∗i ∪ S∗j ,QS∗i∪ S∗j,t ) − ud,m(S∗i ,QS∗i ,t )
∀S∗j ∈ Π∗,S∗j , S∗i ,
Due to considering all of these conditions together, the
minimum of δ is given.
